Küng, Picard and Towse 2008) and the distinction between audience and users markets, following the seminal work by Picard (1989). In this experiment, we also include established techniques of media industries‟ analysis like a value-chain analysis (e.g. In this paper, we experiment and adopt „new‟ economic approaches to interrogate some of the fundamental changes and continuities in the music industry „system‟ that have been produced as a result of digitalisation. What happens outside the individuals’ skulls, in the environments of individuals and in their interactions patterns, should also receive due attention. Especially if economic theory is not ultimately interested in individual decisions, but in how aggregate behavior responds to incentives, attention should not be limited to what happens inside the skulls of individuals. While the potential importance of an improved utility theory for economic theory cannot be denied, however, it remains to be seen whether an improved utility theory is something economic theory needs most badly or most urgently. BES and Glimcher’s ENA also seem to converge on the view that the neuroeconomics’ ultimate aim is to contribute to the construction of a new utility theory with stronger predictive power than standard expected utility theory. There is a growing consensus, it seems, about the brain areas in which the final stages of individual decision-making occur and about relevant features of brain activity in these areas. Recent developments suggest that the gap between the two camps is closing, however. The camps disagreed not only about substantive issues but also about what neuroeconomics ultimately aims to accomplish. Two camps, behavioral economics in the scanner (BES) and Glimcher’s economics of neural activity (ENA), could be clearly distinguished. Neuroeconomics started off as a hybrid project. Having explained why neurocellular economics preserves rather than challenges the standard concept of economic agency, the paper defends the continued use of that concept against calls for its replacement by objects and processes identified through psychological and neuroscientific observation. The paper argues that what it dubs ‘neurocellular economics’, the programme of research initiated by Paul Glimcher, some of his NYU-based colleagues, and his current and former students, is importantly different in its implicit attitude to standard economic agency from a more reductionist version of neuroeconomics that has lately been stapled to BE in would-be service of a paradigm shift. This proposal is resisted on the basis of an argument against the view held by increasingly many behavioral economists that their program collapses into the ambition of the new ‘neuroeconomics’ to identify and explain the processes by which brains comparatively value actual and prospective rewards. The paper then discusses why and how (some) behavioral economists propose to modify agency in light of studies of people, in cases where normative phenomenalism is not assumed. This provides the basis of an account of how economists should respond to widespread criticisms reflecting normative phenomenalism, the view that ‘good’ scientific conceptual frameworks should describe manifest phenomena. The paper reviews the standard concept of the economic agent as featured in contemporary microeconomics, showing why the practice of economists does not equate this agent to a person, and why economists’ longstanding interests in ‘individualism’ and ‘microfoundations’ should not be interpreted as suggesting otherwise.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
Details
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |